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Hall Street Blues: The Uncertain Future of 
Manifest Disregard 
By Jill Gross' 
The scope of permissible judicial review of arbitration awards poses 
the fundamental policy question of whether and to what degree courts 
should intervene in the finality of the arbitration process to ensure its 
integrity. Any regulation of arbitration must balance enforcement of 
the parties' selection of that dispute resolution process with courts' 
reluctance to stamp their imprimatur on awards resulting from a 
fundamentally unfair process or reflecting a fundamentally unfair 
outcome. Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")' provides "stream-
lined"2 mechanisms to enable arbitration parties to obtain prompt 
confirmation," vacatur" or modificationS of an arbitration award on 
specified grounds without the need to file collateral actions that 
otherwise would be required to enforce an award in court. 
Since the enactment of the FAA, some courts have crafted extra-
statutory grounds for award enforcement, due to their discomfort with 
award finality and arbitrators' lack of accountability." For example, 
courts have vacated "arbitrary and capricious"7 awards, those 
rendered in "manifest disregard of the law,'" and those that contra-
vened public policy." Some parties to arbitration agreements, perhaps 
troubled by the unbridled power of arbitrators to bind them to awards 
that do not necessarily follow the law, manage risk by incorporating 
expanded grounds for judicial review of the award, particularly for 
legal error, into their arbitration agreements.'o 
The Supreme Court halted this expansion in Hall Street Assocs. v. 
Mattel, Inc.
" 
The Court resolved a widening split in the circuit Courts 
of Appeal12 and ruled that the grounds for vacating an arbitration 
award listed in section lO(a) of the FAA13 are exclusive. Thus, parties 
cannot contractually expand the grounds for judicial review of an 
arbitration award when invoking FAA's vacatur provisions. 14 In 
balancing the competing policy concerns of arbitration law, the Hall 
Street Court elevated the finality of arbitration over the parties' 
freedom of contract. 
The Hall Street decision necessarily impacted subsequent jurispru-
dence regarding parties' motions to vacate arbitration awards. While 
'Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, and Director, Pace Investor 
Rights Clinic. 
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the opinion clearly and explicitly barred further contractual expan-
sion of grounds for review, it also avoided and thus left unresolved the 
issue of whether it would endorse or reject the judicially-crafted 
"manifest disregard of the law" ground for review of an arbitration 
award.'s In the short time since Hall Street, a new circuit split has 
emerged on the question of whether manifest disregard of the law 
survives Hall Street as a valid ground to vacate an award under the 
FAA.'· This article will explore that question. 
I. Background 
The FAA, enacted by Congress in 1925, declares ''valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable" any "written provision in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or 
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, . . . 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract."'7 The statute reflects a strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration.'· The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that 
Congress promulgated the FAA "to overrule the judiciary's long-
standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate."'9 
Among other powers, the FAA conveys to federal courts the author-
ity to enforce, modify, confirm or vacate arbitration agreements or 
awards arising from maritime transactions or transactions involving 
commerce!O Pursuant to section 9 of the FAA, a court "must" confirm 
an arbitration award "unless" it is vacated, modified, or corrected "as 
prescribed" in sections 10 and 11}' 
FAA section 10 establishes the criteria upon which a court may 
vacate an arbitration award: 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for 
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating 
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(1) where the award was produced by corruption, fraud, or 
undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing 
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or 
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon 
the subject matter submitted was not made!2 
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Section 11 of the FAA provides additional grounds for modifying or 
correcting an award.'3 
The Supreme Court often refers to FAA arbitration as "a matter of 
consent, not coercion," and has declared that "parties are generally 
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit."" 
Because the FAA does not prevent "the enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself," 
parties to arbitration agreements can "specify by contract the rules 
under which that arbitration will be conducted."'5 
Prior to Hall Street, federal appellate courts disagreed as to whether 
section 10 provided the exclusive basis for vacatur relief in cases aris-
ing under the FAA.'· The First,27 Third;" Fourth;" Fifth30 and Sixth 
Circuits" held that parties may contract for expanded judicial review 
beyond the scope of section 10. These courts premised their respective 
holdings on the notion that the FAA, first and foremost, is a statute 
designed to enforce parties' agreements to arbitrate according to their 
specific terms." If the parties specified in their arbitration agreements 
additional grounds for review, then the court should apply those 
grounds. 
By contrast, the Seventh," Ninth34 and Tenth35 Circuits held that 
parties may not expand judicial review contractually. These courts 
reasoned that, while allowing parties to choose by contract the rules 
and procedures they wanted to govern their arbitration process, the 
Supreme Court has never allowed parties to determine by contract 
what rules and procedures a federal court should follow.3• These courts 
rejected the creation of federal powers by contract.37 
In 2007, Hall Street provided the Supreme Court with an op-
portunity to resolve this circuit split. 
II. The Hall Street Opinion 
Hall Street arose from a landlord-tenant dispute. MatteI rented 
property from Hall Street Associates to use for manufacturing. A pro-
vision in the lease required MatteI to indemnify Hall Street for any 
costs related to the failure of MatteI (or its predecessor lessees) to 
comply with environmental laws while using the premises. Groundwa-
ter analysis of the leased premises in 1998 revealed the presence of 
high levels of trichloroethylene ("TCE");' a toxic chemical by-product 
of various manufacturing processes employed by MatteI and its 
predecessors between 1951 and 1980."" 
Subsequent to the TCE discovery, MatteI notified Hall Street of its 
intent to terminate the lease. Hall Street sued, alleging that MatteI: 
(i) did not have the right to vacate the premises on the specified date; 
and (ii) was obligated to indemnify Hall Street for costs connected to 
the TCE well contamination and its related non-compliance with the 
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Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (the "Oregon Act")"o Following a 
bench trial, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
ruled that MatteI could terminate the lease lawfully.41 Thereafter, the 
parties attempted, unsuccessfully, to mediate a settlement of Matters 
disputed duty to indemnify Hall Street:' 
The parties then agreed to arbitrate the indemnification issue. In 
the relevant post-dispute arbitration agreement, the parties provided 
for judicial review of the award for legal error - a basis not found in 
FAA section 10,,3 The arbitrator resolved the dispute in favor of Mat-
teI, reasoning that, since the lease required adherence only to "ap-
plicable" federal, state and local environmental laws, MatteI did not 
owe indemnification costs to Hall Street because the Oregon Act ap-
plied only to human health, not environmental contamination." 
The district court granted Hall Street's motion to vacate the 
arbitrator's award on the basis that the arbitrator committed legal er-
ror in concluding that the Oregon Act did not apply to environmental 
contamination.45 Through application of the agreement's provision for 
expanded judicial review, the district court relied on then-existing 
Ninth Circuit precedent for the principle that parties to an arbitration 
agreement could agree to expand the standards of review of an arbitra-
tion award contractually"· 
On remand, the arbitrator held the Oregon Act applied and MatteI 
moved to vacate the second award. The district court corrected the 
arbitrator's interest calculation but otherwise confirmed the award.47 
MatteI then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
arguing that the Ninth Circuit's recent en banc opinion overturned 
LaPine"· therefore invalidating the expanded standard of review set 
forth in the parties' arbitration agreement. The Ninth Circuit agreed 
with MatteI and reversed the district court's judgment, and the 
Supreme Court granted Hall Street's petition for writ of certiorari to 
resolve the circuit split'" 
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Souter, the Supreme 
Court held the FAA's grounds for prompt vacatur and modification of 
awards are exclusive for parties seeking expedited review pursuant to 
the statute. 50 Furthermore, the Court held parties cannot expand or 
modify these grounds by contract."' Thus, the Hall Street Court 
enforced the portion of the arbitration agreement vesting jurisdiction 
with the arbitrators but not the language providing for expanded 
review.5' In effect, this decision precludes all parties who seek "expe-
ditious judicial review" pursuant to FAA §§ 9 to 11 from incorporating 
expanded standards of review into arbitration agreements."3 
III. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
While not part of its primary holding, Hall Street dicta casts doubt 
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directly on the continued vitality of the "manifest disregard of the 
law" ground for review. The "manifest disregard" standard originated 
from a statement by the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan;" a 1953 
case in which the Court first explored the arbitrability of claims aris-
ing under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"). The Wilko 
Court justified holding Securities Act claims were not arbitrable by 
specifically noting aspects of the arbitration process that could dimin-. 
ish the Securities Act's protections, including the fact that "interpreta-
tions of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard 
are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in 
interpretation. "55 
By 2008, every federal circuit had converted Wilko's dicta into a 
basis to vacate an arbitration award. While the precise test varied 
from circuit to circuit, most courts agreed that, to persuade a court to 
vacate an award on manifest disregard grounds, the losing party 
must show: (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet 
refused to apply it or ignored it altogether; and (2) the law that the 
arbitrators ignored was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to 
the case."· However, the Supreme Court had never directly addressed 
the validity of the "manifest disregard" standard nor was its validity a 
question presented to the Hall Street Court."' 
Yet, the Hall Street Court offered a few comments about "manifest 
disregard" when rejecting Hall Street's contentions about the signifi-
cance of language in Wilko. Hall Street had argued that if judges can 
add grounds of review to the FAA, like the Wilko Court did, then par-
ties can, too."· The Court rejected Hall Street's logic by retorting that 
Wilko did not, in fact, add "manifest disregard" as a ground for review. 
Instead, in attempting to explain precisely what Wilko did mean when 
it used the phrase "manifest disregard," the Court merely speculated: 
Maybe the term "manifest disregard" [as used in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S 
427 (1953)] was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it 
merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to 
them .... Or, as some courts have thought, "manifest disregard" may 
have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the subsections authoriz-
ing vacatur when the arbitrators were "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded 
their powers.,,59 
The Court concluded only that the reference to "manifest disregard" 
in Wilko did not signify, necessarily, that parties may expand grounds 
to vacate contractually"o Thus, while the Hall Street Court did not 
expressly reject "manifest disregard" as a valid ground for review, it 
did not embrace it either. 
IV. Hall Street Progeny: Lower Courts 
In the decisions rendered immediately following Hall Street, lower 
courts tried to make sense of the Supreme Court's less clear dicta 
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regarding "manifest disregard," while applying the unambiguous Hall 
Street holding. For example, one district judge reasoned that it would 
be inconsistent to allow courts to craft from the bench vacatur grounds 
not enumerated by the FAA, while disallowing parties to expand upon 
those same grounds contractually.61 The Prime Therapeutics court 
relied upon the Supreme Court's theory that Congress wrote FAA sec-
tions 9 through 11 to foster expedited review of arbitration awards 
and any expansion or alteration of those provisions would undermine 
that policy.62 Other district courts altogether rejected the continued 
validity of the "manifest disregard" standard of review after Hall 
Street.63 
By contrast, other lower courts at first concluded that Hall Street 
did "nothing to jettison the manifest disregard standard."64 These 
courts seized upon Hall Street's speculation that "manifest disregard" 
might be judicial interpretation of section 10(a), and thus not extra-
statutory.65 For example, in Hale, a credit card account holder brought 
an arbitration claim against her credit card company, alleging it 
violated the Truth in Lending Act through its interest rate charges.66 
An arbitrator deemed the customer's claim frivolous and awarded the 
credit card company $5,600 in attorney's fees. The customer moved to 
vacate the award, asserting that the arbitrator acted in "manifest dis-
regard" of the law by awarding attorney's fees to her credit card 
issuer.61 
The New York trial court applied Hall Street, and held the "manifest 
disregard" standard was another way to interpret the FAA section 
10(a)(4) requirement (arbitrators exceeded their powers).68 However, 
since Hall Street did not define "manifest disregard" under section 
1O(a)(4), the Hale court held arbitrators manifestly disregard the law 
when the record indicates that they knew and deliberately ignored 
well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable law that would affect the 
outcome of the case.69 Hale further held that "manifest disregard" 
exceeds a merely erroneous application or interpretation of the law.10 
Applying that test, the Hale court confirmed the award, holding, inter 
alia, arbitrators possess the authority to fashion appropriate reme-
dies, which necessarily include awards of attorney's fees for claims 
brought in bad faith." 
Likewise, in Halliburton Energy Sues., Inc. u. NL Indus.,12 involving 
a $10 million arbitration award stemming from the parties' disputes 
over environmental remediation costs, a Texas district judge reviewed 
the award for manifest disregard of the law. The Halliburton court 
reasoned that Hall Street did not explicitly determine "whether the 
'manifest disregard' standard remains a separate basis for federal 
court reviews of arbitration decisions in at least some circumstances," 
and noted that considerable Fifth Circuit precedent allowed the ap-
237 
SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL 
plication of the "manifest disregard" standard of review. 73 Applying 
the well-established test, the Halliburton court ultimately denied the 
motion to vacate, determining that the movant "failed to carry its 
burden to show that the panel's decisions interpreting the contracts in 
the [clontract [plhase of the arbitration resulted from 'manifest disre-
gard' of [applicablel contract law.'''4 
As these cases demonstrate, in the first few months after Hall Street, 
trial courts diverged in their approach to the task of reconciling Hall 
Street with the manifest disregard standard of review. 
V. Hall Street Appellate Court Progeny 
As cases made their way up through the appellate system, a new 
circuit split emerged, similar to the earlier lower court split. Thus, the 
Second,75 Sixth,'· and Ninth77 Circuit Courts of Appeals recognized the 
continued vitality of the manifest disregard ground of vacatur. For 
example, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Circuit concluded that Hall 
Street did not abrogate the doctrine, but instead it "declined to resolve 
that question explicitly."'8 The Second Circuit explained that it "views 
the 'manifest disregard' doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a mechanism 
to enforce the parties' agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial 
review of the arbitrators' decision. We must therefore continue to bear 
the responsibility to vacate arbitration awards in the rare instances 
in which 'the arbitrator knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreci-
ated that the principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, 
and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to ap-
ply it.' "'9 Likewise, in Comedy Club, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
Hall Street was not "clearly irreconcilable" with prior Ninth Circuit 
precedent that recognized "manifest disregard" as a prong of review 
under FAA section lO(a)(4).80 
By contrast, in Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,"' a district 
court vacated on manifest disregard grounds a securities arbitration 
award to an investor who claimed unauthorized withdrawals from her 
investment account. The Fifth Circuit flatly rejected "manifest disre-
gard" as a valid ground for vacatur, thus overturning Halliburton.·2 
The Bacon court reasoned that Hall Street unequivocally held the 
statutory grounds are the exclusive means for vacatur under the FAA. 
As a result, because Fifth Circuit case law "defines manifest disregard 
of the law as a non-statutory ground for vacatur, . . . manifest disre-
gard of the law constitutes a nonstatutory ground for vacatur [andl is 
no longer a basis for vacating awards under the FAA."·' 
At the time of publication, two other circuits have addressed 
manifest disregard under Hall Street, but in dicta only. The First 
Circuit declined to consider the issue directly but stated summarily 
that manifest disregard was no longer a valid ground for review after 
238 
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Hall Street. so The Eighth Circuit cited Hall Street as holding "an 
arbitral award may be vacated only for the reasons enumerated in the 
FAA."s, 
VI. The Future of Manifest Disregard 
It appears that this latest circuit split, developed less than one year 
after Hall Street, is heading to the Supreme Court. The Court will 
have to decide whether, under the FAA, "manifest disregard" is a 
statutory ground for review, and thus permissible, or an extra-
statutory ground, and thus prohibited under Hall Street. Did the 
Wilko Court use the term "manifest disregard" to refer to one or more 
of the four grounds listed under section 10, or did it unwittingly cre-
ate fifty-five years of impermissible extra-statutory review by the 
lower courts? 
In my view, Hall Street does not abrogate the "manifest disregard" 
standard of award review. Indeed, the Court stated that it has never 
directly held whether a trial court can review an arbitration award for 
"manifest disregard."s6 Rather, the strict constructionist majority 
merely interpreted the FAA to preclude parties seeking vacatur from 
asserting grounds other than those identified in FAA section 10, and 
suggested that lower courts could construe the bases proVided by sec-
tion 10 as inclusive of "manifest disregard." Hall Street delegated to 
the lower courts the semantic task of assigning the "manifest disre-
gard" label to one of the four sub-grounds of section 10, as the statute 
is not incompatible with the label. Thus, parties can continue to chal-
lenge arbitration awards on the FAA ground that arbitrators commit-
ted misconduct under FAA section 10(a)(3) by manifestly disregarding 
the law or exceeded the scope of its powers under FAA section 10(a)(4) 
by manifestly disregarding the law.67 
Public policy also dictates that courts should preserve this ground 
for review. First, the federal common law of this country - which 
pre-dates and survives the enactment of the FAA - imposed a 
"fundamental fairness" requirement on commercial arbitration.ss 
While acknowledging the general principle that courts should 
intervene only sparely in arbitration matters, courts reasoned that a 
court asked to set aside an arbitration award is a court sitting in 
equity, and no court of equity could confirm an award that resulted 
from a fundamentally unfair process.ss If parties can show that a 
panel manifestly disregarded the law, then it can show a fundamen-
tally unfair process. "Manifest disregard" roots out fundamental 
unfairness. 
Second, if an arbitration panel manifestly disregards law arising 
under a federal statutory cause of action, then disputing parties can-
not effectively vindicate their statutory rights. The Supreme Court 
has frowned upon unfair arbitration processes that do not permit par-
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ties to vindicate their statutory rights."o Depriving courts of the 
manifest disregard weapon would frustrate their ability to enforce 
that principle post-award. 
Third, just as pre-Hall Street contracting parties insisted on 
expanded grounds for review in any pre-dispute arbitration clause for 
risk management purposes, those same parties are far less likely to 
consent to arbitration if the Court eliminates manifest disregard. If 
fewer commercial parties consent to arbitration, then the function of 
arbitration as one means to alleviate the courts' dockets would 
diminish. Thus, as a practical matter, to preserve the appeal of 
arbitration, the Court should permit the risk management mecha-
nism of manifest disregard. The national policy favoring arbitration 
requires that the Court balance finality with judicial intervention 
enough to ensure a minimal level of arbitrator accountability by 
retaining the manifest disregard doctrine. 
Finally, until Hall Street, every federal circuit had recognized 
"manifest disregard" as a ground for review for many and varied 
policy reasons. It seems "imprudent" to obliterate a half-century of 
well-developed and well-reasoned jurisprudence based on semantics 
and a rigid view of finality at all costs."' Simply put, I see the elimina-
tion of manifest disregard as a semantic blunder that, in the end, is 
anti-arbitration. 
Conclusion 
For more than 55 years, courts have reviewed arbitration awards 
governed by the FAA for arbitrators' "manifest disregard of the law." 
That narrow doctrine emerged as one extremely limited - but wise -
check on the far-reaching powers of arbitrators to resolve disputes eq-
uitably, privately, quickly and at relatively low cost. According to 
three out of four Courts of Appeals that thus far have squarely 
considered the question, Hall Street did not eliminate that doctrine 
from FAA jurisprudence. Unclear dicta in Hall Street should not col-
lide with strong public policy reasons to allow for a narrow exception, 
and a statutorily-supported ground to impose accountability on 
arbitrators. 
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240 
[VOL. 37:32009] HALL STREET BLUES 
confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the 
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this 
title."). 
'See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (listing narrow grounds for vacatur of an award based on er-
rors in the arbitration process). 
'See 9 U.S.C.A. § 11 (listing narrow grounds for modifying or correcting an award). 
"For an extensive listing of federal courts' interpretation on non-statutory 
grounds, see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standard for Vacatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 763-801 (1996). 
7See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
vacatur of portion of award because it was "arbitrary and capricious"). 
·See, e.g., Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, North America, LLC, 497 F.3d 
133, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (vacating arbitration award because arbitration panel 
manifestly disregarded tbe law). Before Hall Street, every circuit had adopted the 
manifest disregard test, although some circuits interpreted the standard far more 
strictly than others. Compare Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 
752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999) (permitting vacatur for manifest disregard only for awards 
that "would result in significant injustice") and Geo. Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & 
Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000) (allowing vacatur for manifest disregard only 
when an award directs the parties to violate the law) with Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 
F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) (defining manifest disregard test to be when the rele-
vant law is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate, and the arbitrators 
consciously chose not to apply it). 
"See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(acknowledging that federal court can vacate an arbitration award rendered contrary 
to a "well-defined and dominant" public policy). 
10Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L. J. 214, 215-18 (2007) (reviewing reasons why com-
mercial parties to arbitration clauses might seek to provide for expanded judicial 
review of awards). 
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). 
"See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text. 
139 U.S.C.A. § lOCal. 
"Clauses that are now invalid include those that specify that a court can review 
an award for "errors of law," or that awards are subject to de novo review in court. 
"See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
'"See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text. 
179 U.S.C.A. § 2. 
1·See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 
1, 24 (1983) (recognizing a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"). 
'"Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985). 
20See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
21Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008). 
229 U.S.C.A. § 10. 
23Section 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order. 
241 
'I 
'I 
SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL 
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district 
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award 
upon the application of any party to the arbitration _ 
a. Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an 
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or prop-
erty referred to in the award. 
b. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, 
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the mat-
ter submitted. 
c. Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of 
the controversy. 
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof 
and promote justice between the parties. 9 U.S.C.A. § II. 
"Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468,476 (1989). 
2'Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468,476 (1989) at 479. 
2SSee Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 n.5 (2008). For a 
discussion of the then-evolving circuit split, see generally Cole, supra note 10, at 219-
22; Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?, DISP RESOL. J. 16 (Nov. 2006/Jan. 2007); Lee 
Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 171 (2003). 
"See Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005). 
2SSee Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
29See. Syncor Intern. Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. 
1997) (unpublished per curiam opinion). 
30See Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 
1995) 
3'See Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. In!'l Mktg. Strategies Inc., 401 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
32E.g., Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCl Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-997 
(5th Cir. 1995). 
33See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 
1501 (7th Cir. 1991). 
34See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
"See Bowen v Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001). 
3·See Bowen v Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934 (10th Cir. 2001). 
37E.g., Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 
1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). 
3·See United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ATSDR 
- Toxic Substances - Trichloroethylene (TCE), available at: http://www.atsdr.cdc.go 
v/substances/toxsubstance.asp?toxid-30 (last visited May 23, 2009). 
39Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008). 
40See Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act of 1981, Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 
242 
[VOL. 37:3 2009] HALL STREET BLUES 
448 (Aug. 21, 1981). 
"Hall St. Assocs., L.L. C. v. Mattei, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Or. 2001). 
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008). 
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-1401 (2008). The provi-
sion, in its entirety, ststsd: "The United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon may enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by 
vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or correct 
any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of fact are not supported by substantial 
evidence; or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous." Hall Street 
Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-1401 (2008) (citing post-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement). 
44Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (2008). 
,sHall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (2008). 
45See LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), 
vacated by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential· Bache Trade Svcs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th 
Cir.2003). 
47Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattei Inc., 2007 WL 656445 (D. Or. Feb. 26, 2007). 
4SSee Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattei, Inc., 113 Fed. Appx. 272, 272-73 (9th Cir. 
2004), citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Svcs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding the grounds for vacatur under 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 are exclusive and 
parties cannot contract for alternative standards of review). 
49Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (2008); see also Hall St. 
Assocs., L.L. C. v. Mattei, Inc., 196 Fed. Appx. 476 (9th Cir. 2006); Hall St. Assocs., 
L.L.C. v. Mattei, Inc., 550 U.S. 968 (2007) (cert. granted). 
,oHall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1403. Justice Souter was joined by five other Justices; 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, both filed dissenting 
opinions. 
"Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008). 
52While the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit, it vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for consideration of independent issues. 
See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008); Hall St. Assocs. v. 
Mattei Inc., 531 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2008). 
53 Also left unresolved in Hall Street is the question of whether parties can invoke 
state arbitration law as a separate source of vacatur remedies. The Hall Street Court 
opined that the FAA procedures are only one route a party might invoke for judicial 
review of arbitration awards: "The FAA is not the only way into court for parties 
wanting review of arbitration awards; they may contemplate enforcement under state 
statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is 
arguable." Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008). Thus, the 
Court left the door open for parties wanting to invoke state arbitration law in state 
court, even for actions arising out of arbitration agreements "involving commerce." 9 
U.S.C. § 2. Since Hall Street, several stste courts have referred to their home state's 
arbitration law as a separate avenue for vacatur, but those courts still disagree as to 
whether their state's arbitration law allows for expanded grounds of review. Compare 
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, 190 P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008) (holding Hall Street 
does not preclude state courts from enforcing agreements to expand the grounds of 
review of arbitration awards under state law), with Quinn v. Nafta Traders, Inc., 257 
S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008) (concluding that Texas' arbitration act, like the 
243 
SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL 
FAA, provides for expedited review of arbitration awards only on those grounds speci-
fied in the statute; parties cannot expand those grounds by contract). A related issue 
is whether FAA section 10 preempts state vacatur law in state court. I have previ-
ously written that in does not, except in the rare circumstance where state vacatur 
law permits broad de novo review of award. See Jill 1. Gross, Over-Preemption of State 
Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004). Thus, state law 
might very well provide alternative vacatur procedures. 
5'Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson I Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
55Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953). The Court, in turn, cited to an 
1874 Supreme Court decision where the Court reviewed an admiralty arbitration 
award for "manifest mistake of law," which it equated to "misapprehension of the 
law," or if "arbitrators violated any principle of law." United States v. Farragut, 89 
U.S. 406,420-231 (1874). 
56See, e.g., GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 76 (2d Cir. 2003). Most 
courts and commentators agreed that this standard is very difficult to meet and 
leaves most disputants with virtually no avenue for appeal if they believe the arbitra-
tors misapplied the law. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration 
Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415 
(2003); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and 
Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005); Norman S. Poser, Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471 
(1998) (arguing that manifest disregard standard is inadequate). 
57See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (dictum) 
(citing Wilko as providing one of few "unusual circumstances" under which a court 
can set aside "all arbitration award and describing Wilko as stating "parties bound by 
arbitrator's decision not in 'manifest disregard' of the law") (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953». 
,sHali Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008). 
59Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008). 
6°Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008). 
61Prime Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp.2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 
2008). 
62Prime Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp.2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 
2008). 
"See Medicine Shoppe Intern. Inc. v. Simmonds, 2009 WL 367703, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. 2009) (concluding that the Hall Street Court "determined that because 'manifest 
disregard for the law' is not a prescribed basis upon which an arbitrator's award may 
be vacated or modified under §§ 10 or 11, a reviewing court cannot engage in such a 
general review of an arbitrator's award to search for any legal error"); Robert Lewis 
Rosen Assoc. Ltd. v. Webb, 566 F. Supp.2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding manifest 
disregard of the law standard "no longer good law"), overruled by Stolt-Nielsen SA v. 
Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F .3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008); ALS & Associates, Inc. v. 
AGM Marine Constructors, Inc., 557 F. Supp.2d 180, 185 (D. Mass. June 2, 2008); 
Ascension Orthopedics, Inc. v. Curasan, AG, 2008 WL 2074058, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 
14, 2008); Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2009 WL 104666, at *5 (Ala. Jan. 9, 2009). 
6'Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008); see 
also Mastec North America, Inc. v. MSE Power Systems, Inc., 581 F. Supp.2d 321 
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (considering a "manifest disregard" challenge to an award but deny-
244 
[VOL. 37:3 2009] HALL STREET BLUES 
ing it on the merits). 
65See, e.g., Mastec North America, 581 F. Supp.2d at 325 (citing Chase Bank 
USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 348-49) (electing to view "manifest disregard" of 
law as jndicial interpretation of the Section 10 requirements, rather than as a sepa-
rate standard of review, and will "resort to existing case law to determine its 
contours"). 
66Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008); 15 
U.S.CA §§ 1601 et seq. 
67Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347-348 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 
2008). 
6sChase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 
2008). The trial court assumed without deciding that FAA section 10 grounds applied 
in state court, and thus preempted state vacatur law. For a discussion of whether sec-
tion 10 preempts state vacatur law, see Gross, supra note 53. 
s9Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 
2008). 
70Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 
2008). 
"Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-349 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 
2008). 
'"Halliburton Energy Svcs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp.2d 733 (S.D. Tex. 
2008). 
73Halliburton Energy Svcs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp.2d 733, 753 (S.D. Tex. 
2008). 
74Halliburton Energy Svcs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp.2d 733, 762 (S.D. Tex. 
2008). 
75Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(recognizing post-Hall Street split and stating that "[w]e agree with those courts that 
take the. . . approach [that manifest disregard remains a valid ground for vacating 
arbitration awards]"), cert. granted, No. 08-1198, 2009 WL 803120 (June 15, 2009). 
76Coffee Beanery, Ltd. V. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) ("In 
light of the Supreme Court's hesitation to reject the 'manifest disregard' doctrine in 
all circumstances, we believe it would be imprudent to cease employing such a 
universally recognized principle. Accordingly, this Court will follow its well-
established precedent here and continue to employ .the 'manifest disregard' 
standard."); see also Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. V. Bank of Oklahoma, 304 Fed. 
Appx. 360, 362 (6th Cir. 2008) (same). 
77Comedy Club, Inc. V. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(stating "[w]e cannot say that Hall Street Associates is 'clearly irreconcilable' with 
Kyocera and thus we are bound by our prior precedent. Therefore, we conclude that, 
after Hall Street Associates, manifest disregard of the law remains a valid ground for 
vacatur because it is a part of § 10(a)(4)") (internal citations omitted). 
7·Stolt-Nielsen SA u. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008). 
79Stolt-Nielsen SA V. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (cit-
ing Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 217). In so holding, the Second Circuit drew from a 
pre-Hall Street decision in which the Seventh Circuit equated the FAA vacatur mech-
anism as a means for a losing arbitration party to challenge the award on the ground 
245 
::1 
. 1 
SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL 
the arbitrators violated the arbitration agreement, rather than on the -ground the 
arbitrators were mistaken. 548 F.3d at 95 (citing Wise v. Wachovia Sees., LLC, 450 
F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006». 
aOComedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997, and its holding that "arbitrators 'exceed their pow-
ers' . . . when the award is 'completely irrational,' or exhibits a 'manifest disregard of 
law' ") (internal citations omitted). 
a'Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009). 
a2Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) . 
• 3Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009); see 
also Hereford v. Horton, 2009 WL 104666, at *4-5 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 2009) ("Under the 
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates, therefore, manifest disregard of 
the law is no longer an independent and proper basis under the Federal Arbitration 
Act for vacating, modifYing, or correcting an arbitrator's award."); Vermont Built, Inc. 
v. Krolick, 969 A.2d 80, 85-86 n.2 (Vt. 2008) (stating that Hall Street "held that 
under the Federal Arbitration Act a court has no authority to review for an 
arbitrator's legal errors" and clarifying that, under Vermont law, "we do not recognize 
a court's right to review an arbitrator's decision for manifest disregard of the law") . 
··Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Service, 524 F.3d 120, 124, n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(stating in dicta that "[wle acknowledge the Supreme Court's recent holding in Hall 
Street . . .. that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or 
modifYing an arbitral award in caseS brought under the [FAAl. Because the case at 
hand is not an FAA case - neither party has invoked the FAA's expedited review 
provisions, and the original complaint was filed in Puerto Rico state court under a 
mechanism provided by state law - we decline to reach the question of whether Hall 
Street precludes a manifest disregard inquiry in this setting") . 
• 5Crawford Group, Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F_3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008» . 
• 6Hall Street Assocs_ v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008) (insisting that 
"[wle, when speaking as a Court, have merely taken the Wilko language as we found 
it, without embellishment, see First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 
(1995), and now that its meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord it the sig-
nificance [Le., that Wilko held that "manifest disregard" was a valid ground for 
reviewl that Hall Street urges.") 
.7Even the Bacon Court acknowledge that it eliminated manifest disregard as a 
ground for review after Hall Street because Fifth Circuit precedent had semantically 
labeled manifest disregard as extra-statutory. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. 
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009). 
··Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) (confirming award in a commercial 
dispute between a retailer and two wholesalers and stating that "after a full and fair 
hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or 
in fact") . 
• 9Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). 
90See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000) (suggest-
ing that excessive or overly burdensome forum fees, if proven, might bar a court from 
enforcing an arbitration agreement on the grounds that one party cannot vindicate its 
statutory rights); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 637 (1985) (declaring that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federall statute 
246 
[VOL. 37:3 2009] HALL STREET BLUES 
[providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function"); see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2006) (re-
fusing to enforce an arbitration agreement without severing the clause that precludes 
class action arbitration claims on the grounds that it deprives claimants from vindicat-
ing their statutory rights). See generally Jill 1. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The 
Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 510 (2008) 
(describing "vindicating rights" doctrine); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing 
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements - with Particular Consideration of Class Actions 
and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 269-73 (2006) (describing the "effectively 
vindicate" doctrine and noting that the "Supreme Court has yet to flesh out the . . . 
doctrine") . 
• 'Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.£.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(declaring that "we believe it would be imprudent to cease employing such a 
universally recognized principle"). 
247 
